

SYSGO: Enabling Compositional Certification



SYSGO AG



- **Founded in 1992**
- **Leading European Provider for Embedded Operating Systems**
- **120 employees in Germany (Mainz, Ulm, Rostock, Hamburg), France (Paris, Lyon), Czech Republic (Prague) and USA (San Jose)**
- **Part of THALES Group since 11/2012**

Mission Statement

European technology leader to provide the **safest and most secure** operating system for connected devices.



Focus on critical systems

- **Sicherheit** ['zɪçəhaɪt], *noun*


1. as in „safety“: the condition of being safe from undergoing or causing hurt, injury, or loss; a device designed to prevent inadvertent or hazardous operation
2. as in “security”: something that secures or protects; measures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage, crime, attack, or escape

- **Certification for safety & security**

- DO-178B, EN50128, IEC61508, IEC62443, CC's EAL, MILS ...



Company History





Critical systems need approval by the authorities

Certification starts with the operating system

The reliability of a system is more and more determined by software. Consequently software certification is becoming mandatory for many industries.

Avionics started with DO-178, other industries followed with IEC-61508 and right now the automotive industry is implementing its own standard, called ISO-26262.

Security standardization for safety-critical systems **is on-going**, e.g. IEC62443 (part 4) is not yet ready

A certified operating system is the foundation for critical systems. It provides both, the technology and the certification artifacts ready for approval by the authorities.



There's more than one CPU-vendor for embedded systems

Freedom-Of-Choice

starts with the operating system

In contrast the mono-culture in the PC-market, embedded systems have created a huge eco system of different CPUs.

The Internet-of-Things will even push for more specialization.

To support that ecosystem, the operating system shall be prepared for variety and not be tied to a single CPU-vendor.

Where are we in the „Internet Of Things“?

Professional Services



Datacenter Providers



Communications Services Providers



Infrastructure / Gateway




Run-Time Environment



Hardware



Related European Projects: EURO-MILS



EURO-MILS Objective and Strategy

- **High-criticality networked cyber-physical systems**
 - Drivers are avionics and automotive
 - EURO-MILS delivers cross-domain solutions
- **Integration and networking requires trustworthy ICT**
- **MILS – Multiple Independent Levels of Security**
 - High-assurance security architecture
 - Scalable and affordable security
 - **Compositional** design, assurance, security

Business and Legal
Foundations for
Trustworthy ICT

Trustworthy Design
by MILS

Assurance for End-
Users


Trustworthy
ICT
for networked
high-critical
systems

- ➡ **EURO-MILS: First pan-European MILS architecture and certifiable platform**
- ➡ **EURO-MILS: Compositional methodology for security evaluation with high-assurance methods**
- ➡ **EURO-MILS: Protection Profile for critical ICT component**




EURO-MILS: 2 prototypes on the MILS platform

Avionic



Automotive



Trustworthy ICT
for networked
high-critical systems

Selected EURO-MILS Results

- MILS Architectural Template



<http://euomils.eu/downloads/2014-EURO-MILS-MILS-Architecture-white-paper.pdf>

- MILS OS Protection Profile



<http://euomils.eu/downloads/Deliverables/Y2/2015-EURO-MILS-Protection-Profile-White-Paper-V1.2.pdf>

- MILS: Business, Legal and Social Acceptance



<http://euomils.eu/downloads/Deliverables/Y3/EURO-MILS-D13.2-PU-M36-V1.0.pdf>

- Used Formal Modelling



<http://afp.sourceforge.net/entries/CISC-Kernel.shtml>

- Non-Interfering Composed Security Evaluation



http://euomils.eu/downloads/white_paper_non.pdf

- Addendum to CC CEM for high-assurance



http://euomils.eu/downloads/Deliverables/Y3/EURO-MILS_D33.1_Addendum-to-CEM_PU_M36-V1.0.pdf

- Formal Models



<http://euomils.eu/downloads/Deliverables/Y2/2015-EM-UsedFormalMethods-WhitePaper-October2015.pdf>