



Zero Trust & The Flaming Sword of Justice

How The Security Leader Enables Business Outcomes

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WHOAMI

- Dave Lewis
- Global Advisory CISO, Cisco
- Hacker
- Grey Beard
- Coffee Drinker
- Whisky Distillery Co-Owner
- Football Club Co-Owner







What
is
love



It's On Fire Yo!

What is Zero Trust?

- Where/how/when trust is decided has changed
- Must continuously verify
- Assume all networks are hostile
- This is not a “rip & replace” conversation



Zero Trust: Principles




- No implicit trust
- Strongly authenticated user
- Strongly authenticated device
- Encrypted connection to resource
- Policy decision and enforcement



(Read the rest at [NIST SP 800-207](#))



NIST SP 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture



Zero Trust capabilities



Establish
Trust



Enforce Trust-
Based Access




Continuously
Verify Trust



Respond to
Change in Trust

What it takes to get Zero Trust right

Zero Trust requirements



ZTN Value Proposition



Devaluation of stolen credentials

Low hanging fruit sours.

Complicates lateral movement through uniform security policy.

Attackers have to work that much harder.

**WORKED FINE IN
DEV**

OPS PROBLEM NOW

Don't trust something
just because it's on the
"inside" of your firewall





Is the password...password?



No!! Now go away, or I shall taunt you a second time!





Castles Don't Scale



Lessons From History

The sack of Rome in 410 AD






Remember when
you only had to
outrun the other
hiker?


Now there's more
than enough bear to
go around






Zero Trust Maturity Model

It's a journey, and a destination.



The Ecosystem



A man with a beard and a dark eye patch, wearing a heavy, dark fur coat and gloves, holds a sword that is engulfed in bright, intense flames. The background is a clear, light blue sky. The overall scene is dramatic and evokes a sense of power and justice.

The Flaming Sword of Justice



“The perimeter is anywhere an access decision is being made.”

New Perimeter




**Remote
Employees**



**Hybrid
Cloud**



**Cloud
Applications**




**Personal
Devices**



**Mobile
Devices**



**Vendors &
Contractors**



Old Perimeter
Traditional Network:
Endpoints, On-site Users,
Servers, Apps

Data Breaches



81%

Of breaches involve stolen or weak **credentials**

70%

Of breaches involve compromised **devices**

The Summer of Breach 2012

Site Breached	Users Affected	Link	Confirmed
Yahoo	453,000	CNN	Yes
Formspring	420,000	Securityweek	Yes
Phandroid	1,000,000	Securityweek	Yes
Billabong	21,485	IT News AU	Yes
Nvidia	800	PCWorld	Yes
LinkedIn	6,460,000	Globe and Mail	Yes
eHarmony	1,500,000	ZDNet	Yes
Consumerist	TBD	Consumerist	Yes/TBD

Been There...




r00tbeer_

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Hades_ - Eriksson - Akira - Taz
r00tBeer Security Team





YEARS AGO...

2022

CDEK
19,000,000
Contact tracing data
38,000,000
Digital Ocean

Experian Brazil
220,000,000

Facebook
533,000,000

Shanghai Police

T-Mobile
Thailand visitors
100,000,000

Syniverse

Microsoft
250,000,000

2021
Amazon Reviews
India

Canva
139,000,000

Dubsmash
162,000,000

EasyJet
8,000,000
db815td
22,000,000
Experian SA

Indian citizens
275,000,000

OxyData
380,000,000

Pakistani mobile operators
115,000,000

2020
8fit
BriarsClub
25,000,000
Aviva
Blank Media
Carmera

Capital One
100,000,000

Chtrbox

Facebook
420,000,000

Indian citizens
275,000,000

ShareThis
Suprema
TicketFly

Whitepages
Wawa
30,000,000
YouNow

2019
Apollo
200,000,000
Careem
Animoto

Chinese resume leak
202,000,000

Facebook
50,000,000

Houzz
MyHeritage

MyFitnessPal
150,000,000

Quora
100,000,000

SKY Brasil
Texas voter records

Twitter
330,000,000

2018
Aadhaar

Aadhaar

Cathay Pacific Airways

Firestore
100,000,000

Marriott International
383,000,000

Newegg
Nametests
120,000,000

Spambot

Uber
Yahoo
Zomato

What's Open In Portugal?



1,000,276

So, Why Should We Be Concerned?

418

Vulnerable to
Heartbleed


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Compromised
Databases


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Industrial Control
Systems

Hi There!



SSH



OpenSSH Version: 5.3

```
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.3
Key type: ssh-rsa
Key: AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAuMYPp6zWf
u5sT6mseXyMvaeXfBSEfgT1izSdNElbAE5AHzWQb5
5tTBmeK/mvMbrSSprP0eISvXtEG8f0n//K/hzvyU
HiEDXwWfsOvTsnbb34XvK0gPU+NiuYtA2//is8D+
ssdDeMPBtZ4DBMQ140DTctt/5a/6zTwnCqLCCY8E
Fingerprint: 0b:b6:83:c3:a9:e1:c7:94:de:7
```

Kex Algorithms:

```
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
```

Server Host Key Algorithms:

```
ssh-rsa
ssh-dss
```

Encryption Algorithms:

```
aes128-ctr
aes192-ctr
aes256-ctr
arcfour256
arcfour128
aes128-cbc
3des-cbc
blowfish-cbc
cast128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
arcfour
rijndael-
```

MAC Algorithms:

```
hmac-md5
hmac-sha1
umac-64@openssh.com
hmac-sha2-256
hmac-sha2-512
hmac-ripemd160
hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com
hmac-sha1-96
hmac-md5-96
```


⚠ Vulnerabilities

Note: the device may not be impacted by all of these issues. The vulnerabilities are implied based on the software and version.

CVE-2011-5000	The ssh_gssapi_parse_ename function in gss-serv.c in OpenSSH 5.8 and earlier, when gssapi-with-mic authentication is enabled, allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a large value in a certain length field. NOTE: there may be limited scenarios in which this issue is relevant.
CVE-2016-10708	sshd in OpenSSH before 7.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and daemon crash) via an out-of-sequence NEWKEYS message, as demonstrated by Honggfuzz, related to kex.c and packet.c.
CVE-2014-1692	The hash_buffer function in schnorr.c in OpenSSH through 6.4, when Makefile.inc is modified to enable the J-PAKE protocol, does not initialize certain data structures, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger an error condition.
CVE-2010-5107	The default configuration of OpenSSH through 6.1 enforces a fixed time limit between establishing a TCP connection and completing a login, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (connection-slot exhaustion) by periodically making many new TCP connections.
CVE-2017-15906	The process_open function in sftp-server.c in OpenSSH before 7.6 does not properly prevent write operations in readonly mode, which allows attackers to create zero-length files.
CVE-2010-4478	OpenSSH 5.6 and earlier, when J-PAKE is enabled, does not properly validate the public parameters in the J-PAKE protocol, which allows remote attackers to bypass the need for knowledge of the shared secret, and successfully authenticate, by sending crafted values in each round of the protocol, a related issue to CVE-2010-4252.
CVE-2016-0777	The resend_bytes function in roaming_common.c in the client in OpenSSH 5.x, 6.x, and 7.x before 7.1p2 allows remote servers to obtain sensitive information from process memory by requesting transmission of an entire buffer, as demonstrated by reading a private key.
CVE-2011-4327	ssh-keysign.c in ssh-keysign in OpenSSH before 5.8p2 on certain platforms executes ssh-rand-helper with unintended open file descriptors, which allows local users to obtain sensitive key information via the ptrace system call.
CVE-2010-4755	The (1) remote_glob function in sftp-glob.c and the (2) process_put function in sftp.c in OpenSSH 5.8 and earlier, as used in FreeBSD 7.3 and 8.1, NetBSD 5.0.2, OpenBSD 4.7, and other products, allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (CPU and memory consumption) via crafted glob expressions that do not match any pathnames, as demonstrated by glob expressions in SSH_EXP_STAT requests to an sftp daemon, a different vulnerability than CVE-2010-2632.



Bastion Hosts



From DMZ To The Soft Chewy Centre





A Game of Increments

Determining Priorities





1

How do you stop attacks that use stolen (yet legitimate) credentials?



2

How do you prevent devices with poor security hygiene from accessing critical apps?

Security Best Practices

Policies Are Unique to Each User and Device




Verify Your Users

- Strong Authentication
- Intuitive Authentication
- User Risk Assessment



Verify Their Devices

- Up-to-date Devices
- Well-configured Devices
- Managed Devices
- Device Authentication



Protect Every Application

- All Cloud Apps
- All On-Prem Apps
- Consistent End User Experience & Security

Example: Stolen Credentials



Attackers
must
compromise:

- Username
- Password
- 2nd auth factor
- Trusted device

Enforce Policy Based Controls


Get Granular

- Block anonymous networks, out-of-date browsers and plugins, and rooted or jailbroken devices
- Require users to enable screen-lock and use U2F or push authentication
- Ensure all systems are up-to-date



Trusted Access: leverage your existing investments

- Secure VPNs with MFA and device-level hygiene
- Ensure only managed devices can access network or cloud apps leveraging MDM agents
- Easily add protection for cloud apps in addition to your on-prem NAC



Note: No agents required


ENCRYPT



ALL THE THINGS!

Webauthn

Biometric Authentication Ecosystem



ZTN Summary



Build an asset inventory.

Get a solid hold on user management.


What's on your network?

Defined Repeatable Process

User and Entity Behavior Analytics.

Network Zone Segmentation.

The Sword Is Dissolving



No Need For The Holy Hand Grenade



Thanks!

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[@gattaca](https://twitter.com/gattaca) [@infosec.exchange](https://www.infosec.exchange)

