




Action plan Netherlands Cybersecurity Strategy 2022-2028

Ambitions and actions for a digitally secure society



Cover photo: We are using cash less and less frequently. These days, 81% of payments at the checkout are contactless. That makes it all the more important that our payment transactions remain secure.

Action plan

Netherlands Cybersecurity Strategy 2022-2028


Ambitions and actions for a digitally secure society

The Netherlands Cybersecurity Strategy (NLCS) has been produced with the involvement of a wide range of public, private and civil society organisations, coordinated by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV). The Cybersecurity Assessment for the Netherlands (CSBN) forms the basis for the pillars and aims of the NLCS.

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Digitalisation is an important step towards ensuring healthcare remains accessible for everyone and reducing pressure on healthcare professionals.



Pillar I

Cyber resilience of the government, businesses and civil society organisations

Aim 1: Organisations have a clear picture of cyber incidents, threats and risks and know how to deal with them

Review of the cybersecurity ecosystem

<p>Action summary The NCSC, DTC and CSIRT-DSP will be merged into a single national cybersecurity authority (CSIRT).</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V, EZK</p> <p>Involved NCSC, DTC, CSIRT-DSP</p>
<p>Action summary For government organisations in the cybersecurity information-sharing ecosystem, we will explore which tasks could be centralised (with the national cybersecurity authority) and which should be sector-based.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner J&V, EZK</p> <p>Involved VWS, BZK, DEF, OCW, I&W</p>
<p>Action summary A roadmap will be drawn up with the business sector for the implementation of a public-private platform for reciprocal cybersecurity information and knowledge sharing. The basis for this programme is the Cyclotron report.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved NCSC, DTC, AIVD, MIVD, police, Public Prosecution Service, private partners, local and regional authorities</p>
<p>Action summary The NCSC and its partners will explore the feasibility of a central national campus to promote cooperation, information sharing, knowledge development and research between public and private stakeholders.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved NCSC, DTC, AIVD, MIVD, police</p>

Strengthen the Nationwide Network of Cybersecurity Partnerships (LDS)

<p>Action summary The legal framework will be modified to enable organisations in the LDS to share cybersecurity information with each other more widely, more efficiently and more effectively. Examples include the forthcoming amendment of the Network and Information Systems (Security) Act (WBNl), which will be debated in the House of Representatives this autumn and the parliamentary bill on promoting cyber resilience in the business sector.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V, EZK</p> <p>Involved NCSC, DTC</p>
<p>Action summary Requirements for joining the LDS will be drawn up at interministerial level. They will be binding for government organisations while providing guidance for private organisations. Private partners will be involved in developing these guidelines.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved EZK, VWS, I&W, DTC, NCSC</p>
<p>Action summary The government will support organisations in the information security chains, which will enable them to secure sustainable funding.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved NCSC, DTC</p>
<p>Action summary A LDS communications plan will be issued to guide organisations within the system. Part of this will involve establishing clear points of contact.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2025</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved BZK, EZK, NCSC, DTC</p>

Expand organisations within the LDS

<p>Action summary An LDS building plan will be drawn up in collaboration with private partners to enable the government to work with the business sector to increase the coverage of the LDS. As part of this building plan, an overview of the current state of the LDS will generate insight into initiatives that have already been developed and the gaps that currently exist in the LDS.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved EZK, OCW, VWS, I&W, BZK, NCSC, DTC, subnational authorities and private partners</p>
<p>Action summary With the aid of a financial contribution from the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) and coordinated by the Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO), provinces will continue setting up an interprovincial information hub as a connecting organisation within the LDS.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved IPO</p>
<p>Action summary The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW) will set up a CERT for primary and secondary education.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner OCW</p> <p>Involved OCW and SURFcert</p>
<p>Action summary The Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (I&W) will strengthen the CERT Water Management.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner I&W</p> <p>Involved RWS</p>

National Detection Network (NDN)

<p>Action summary All central government organisations not yet connected to the National Detection Network will be added.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved J&V, CIO-Rijk, NCSC</p>
<p>Action summary Collaboration and information-sharing between the partners in the NDN (AIVD, MIVD, NCSC) and service provision for affiliated organisations will be strengthened through enhanced knowledge-sharing.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved AIVD, MIVD, NCSC, CIO-Rijk</p>

Victim notification

<p>Action summary Research will be conducted to determine how businesses and the public who are at risk of being targeted or who are victims of cyber incidents can best be informed. The NCTV and NCSC will look specifically at what form victim notification from a non-criminal-investigation source could take.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved NCSC, AIVD, MIVD, private partners</p>
<p>Action summary The police and the Public Prosecution Service (OM) will explore how best to proceed with the notification of victims revealed by criminal investigations.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2025</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved OM, Police, NCTV, NCSC</p>

Aim 2: Organisations are properly protected against cybersecurity risks and are mindful of their own importance to the sector and other organisations in the chain

Cyber resilience of critical infrastructure

<p>Action summary The revised EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2) will be implemented in the Netherlands via the WBNI in 2024.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved OCW, BZK, I&W, VWS, FIN, EZK, LNV, MIVD, AIVD and NCSC</p>
<p>Action summary To minimise the burden on businesses, the implementation of sectoral legislation, such as the DORA and the Network Code, and related legislation, such as the CER Directive, will be closely coordinated with the implementation of NIS2.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved FIN, EZK, OCW, BZK, I&W, VWS and LNV</p>
<p>Action summary In 2023, the government will start extensive public information campaigns to inform organisations falling within the scope of the new legislation of their rights and obligations, and to actively guide them through the implementation process.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved OCW, BZK, I&W, VWS, FIN, EZK and LNV</p>
<p>Action summary To ensure quality and consistency in the monitoring of the WBNI after the implementation of NIS2, the 'Coordinated inspection framework of cybersecurity of critical processes' and related governance will be developed further. This will ensure cohesion in and transparency about the information-driven and risk-based monitoring approach.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved OCW, BZK, I&W, VWS, FIN, EZK and LNV</p>

<p>Action summary Explore the possibility of setting up a central hotline whereby NIS2 notifications can be made easily and simultaneously to the CSIRT and the supervisory authority. This exploration will also encompass notifications under related legislation (GDPR, DORA, Net-work Code).</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved OCW, BZK, I&W, VWS, FIN, EZK and LNV</p>
<p>Action summary Evaluate the current method used to determine thresholds for mandatory reporting of cyber incidents under the WBNI. These findings will in any event be taken into account when determining thresholds for newly designated suppliers.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved OCW, BZK, I&W, VWS, FIN, EZK and LNV</p>
<p>Action summary Given the increase in the number of target group organisations, the NCSC will produce and implement scalable technologies for digital and automated information-sharing with and among target groups and partners.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved NCSC</p>
<p>Action summary The NIS2 requirements intersect with the Government Information Security Baseline (BIO) and will be incorporated into it where applicable, so as to retain a recognisable connection with the security baseline for the government.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved</p>
<p>Action summary A start will be made on exploring the steps necessary to boost the cyber resilience of critical infrastructure in the Caribbean Netherlands.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved BZK</p>

<p>Action summary The government will launch an enhanced strategy to bolster the protection of the Netherlands' critical infrastructure. This will include a review of critical infrastructure policy and the related legislation, partly in the light of the CER and NIS2 directives. Critical suppliers will be consulted about the new system in early 2023. The enhanced strategy will also provide for structural partnerships with some of the critical sectors, an enhanced policy instrument to gain a better picture of sectoral risks and dependencies, and the further development of information-sharing on vulnerabilities and threats. Cybersecurity is an integral part of this.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved OCW, BZK, I&W, VWS, FIN, EZK, LNV, NCSC, AIVD and MIVD</p>
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Cyber resilience of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the wider business sector

<p>Action summary NCSC and DTC will develop new products and services, focusing on issues such as the embedding of cybersecurity in the risk management process, crisis preparation, incident response and thematic advice. All these differentiated and data-driven information-and-knowledge products and services will be made easily accessible in a manner appropriate to an organisation's level of maturity.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V, EZK</p> <p>Involved NCSC, DTC</p>
<p>Action summary Produce first version of central registers for cybersecurity-related information (i.e. type of ransomware, vulnerabilities).</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved NCSC</p>
<p>Action summary Encourage SMEs to use tools, such as risk scans, and products and security recommendations, including possible courses of action. This could be achieved via trade associations, for example through the public-private platform <i>Samen Digitaal Veilig (Digitally Safe Together)</i>.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved DTC, NCSC, VNO-NCW, MKB-Nederland</p>
<p>Action summary The government will produce a single set of basic measures and promote it for use by organisations on a voluntary basis.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved EZK, BZK, NCSC, DTC, AIVD, MIVD</p>

Cyber resilience in education

<p>Action summary A set of standards for information security and privacy will be implemented for primary and secondary education, to include periodic checks and benchmarks to monitor whether school boards are complying with the norm.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner OCW</p>
<p>Action summary School boards in primary and secondary education are required to focus specifically on information security and privacy in their annual reports.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner OCW</p>
<p>Action summary Efforts will be made in primary and secondary education, secondary vocational and higher education to raise awareness of cyber risks and measures among students, staff and management by means of campaigns, crisis exercises and special working groups.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner OCW</p>
<p>Action summary For their audits, institutions in secondary and higher education will use the Royal Netherlands Institute of Chartered Accountants (NBA) maturity model and SURF's derived Information Security Assessment Framework for Higher Education.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner OCW</p> <p>Involved SURF</p>

Cyber resilience of healthcare institutions

<p>Action summary A revised version of NEN 7510¹ will be published. Implementation tools will also be developed to help improve the implementation rate of NEN 7510.</p>	<p>Timeline 2025</p>	<p>Owner VWS</p>
<p>Action summary The vulnerability analysis tool KAT has been made available as an open-source resource so that all healthcare organisations can use it to scan actively for vulnerabilities in their own systems. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) and Z-CERT are encouraging organisations to do this systematically. The tool will also be made more widely available.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner VWS</p> <p>Involved Z-CERT</p>
<p>Action summary Incident support within the healthcare sector will be expanded by the phased incorporation of new subsectors in the scope of Z-CERT's services. Primary care sectors, such as general practitioners and pharmacies, will join before 2023. In the course of 2023 and 2024, the following sectors will be incorporated: disability care, nursing, social and home care, and rehabilitation care.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner VWS</p> <p>Involved Z-CERT</p>
<p>Action summary The programme <i>Informatie veilig gedrag in de zorg</i> (information security behaviour in the healthcare sector) provides healthcare institutions with ways to promote the secure handling of information.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner VWS</p> <p>Involved ECP, Z-CERT</p>

¹ An information-security standard for the healthcare sector in the Netherlands. Under the Processing of Personal Data in Healthcare (Supplementary Provisions) Act, care providers must comply with NEN 7510.

<p>Action summary In the context of prevention and detection, Z-CERT will organise exercise and test activities with affiliated healthcare institutions and develop best practices in relation to the care-sector-specific information-security standard NEN 7510.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner VWS</p> <p>Involved Z-CERT</p>
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Cyber resilience of the infrastructure and water management sectors

<p>Action summary Strengthening the cyber resilience of sectors for which the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (I&W) bears responsibility, such as drinking water, water quantity control and management, aviation, maritime, nuclear, railways and positioning and timing Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organising administrative consultations with sectors to exchange knowledge and experience and to discuss how to collaborate in order to manage cyber risks; • Developing sectoral knowledge products, such as periodic cybersecurity threat assessments by sector, which contribute to integrated risk management; countering ransomware and understanding supply chain risks; • Facilitating organisations in terms of education, testing, training and exercises so that they are better able to mount a swift response to and recover from cyber incidents, in accordance with sector requirements. 	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner I&W</p> <p>Involved NCSC, AIVD, MIVD, Water Management CERT</p>
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Cyber resilience in central government

<p>Action summary The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations' ambition in this area is set out in the Central Government Information Strategy and the roadmaps presented to the House of Representatives on 15 July 2022.² Examples of concrete actions are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A start will be made in 2022 on the triple-track red-teaming project approach: risk-based testing, knowledge-sharing (within central government) and follow-up on findings. • There will be mandatory basic cyber resilience training for central government staff from 2024. • With the help of CIO-Rijk, parallel efforts will be made to pursue policy for a number of activities: handbooks to accompany the government-wide cloud policy (which was revised in August 2022), tackling risks in quantum computing, government-wide provisions for highly classified information and reinforcing the Central Government system of Security Operation Centres (SOCs). • Alongside dcypher, the government-wide Information Partnership programme will focus on cooperation between central government and higher education in ICT, including cybersecurity. One element of this is the <i>I-doctoraatsprogramma</i>, a course run at university and higher professional education level, which supplies knowledge workers and, through research and innovation, helps to strengthen central government's knowledge basis and tackle the cyber challenges it faces. 	<p>Timeline 2022- 2025</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved NCSC, Central Government CIOs, AIVD, MIVD</p>
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Cyber resilience in the public sector

<p>Action summary An administrative agreement on cybersecurity will be drawn up with the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) in which the joint approach by municipalities in the field of cybersecurity will be elaborated further.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved VNG</p>
<p>Action summary 2023 will see the continued development and monitoring of the Government Information Security Baseline (BIO), including its legal embedding in the Digital Government Act.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p>
<p>Action summary The Centre for Information Security and Privacy (CIP) will extend and update the implementation of the BIO support programme for the government as a whole, thus providing assistance for organisations in the implementation and application of the BIO.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2027</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved CIP</p>
<p>Action summary The CIP will extend and update the expansion and development of the Information Security and Privacy service. Public authorities will receive tailored advice from government experts about cybersecurity and privacy. Organisations with insufficient knowledge about information security will thus be assisted at the appropriate level by organisations with specific expertise.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2027</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved CIP</p>

² Letter to the House of Representatives on the Central Government Information Strategy 2022-2025 roadmaps | Parliamentary paper | Rijksoverheid.nl

<p>Action summary Further development of the ENSIA accountability system, the single information audit unified norm. By organising supervision horizontally and vertically with the BIO as a basis, municipalities are working towards better information security and facilitating democratic accountability in respect of information security.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2025</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved VNG</p>
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Cyber resilience of sectors with operational technology and process automation systems

<p>Action summary Efforts to increase the security of industrial automation and control systems (IACS) are being given a boost by means of a new coalition. Examples of actions taken within the coalition include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing and implementing a significant and realistic IACS component in national exercises and training. • Strengthen knowledge creation and developing instruments such as handbooks and best practices to help public and private organisations implement the right measures for IACS and define and address the right risks. • Sharing these knowledge products and instruments via a collective IACS knowledge hub. 	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner I&W</p> <p>Involved NCSC, EZK, (private) partners</p>
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Insight into cyber resilience of the public sector and business community

<p>Action summary Pilots will be conducted to examine the added value of an IT report and an IT audit statement in the public sector. This will be similar to the usual annual financial report. The study will tie in with pilots conducted in the business sector.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved ADR</p>
<p>Action summary A system is being set up in collaboration with the wider cybersecurity field to monitor the Netherlands' cyber resilience. The first report is expected in 2024.</p>	<p>Timeline 2024 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved BZK, EZK, NCSC, DTC</p>
<p>Action summary The CIP will manage and develop the basisbeveiliging.nl website, where public sector organisations' security scores will be calculated on the basis of various indicators and displayed.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved CIP</p>
<p>Action summary In the context of the Corporate Governance Code, discussions will be held with the business sector on what sort of collaboration could be put in place to manage cybersecurity risks in listed companies.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p>
<p>Action summary We will work with insurers to explore what role they could play in relation to consequential damages resulting from cyber incidents.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved EZK, FIN</p>

Aim 3: Organisations respond to, and recover and learn from, cyber incidents and crises swiftly and efficiently

Incident and crisis preparation

<p>Action summary The updated National Crisis Plan for Digital Incidents (LCP-Digitaal) will be launched and put to use. This plan forms the basis for dealing with a cyber crisis.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved LCP partners</p>
<p>Action summary Individual ministries will ensure that their crisis plans are in line with the LCP-Digitaal, and can show that incident, continuity and recovery plans have been tested by means of, for example, a training exercise or an audit. Ministries will also follow up on training and other evaluations and findings.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved Ministries</p>
<p>Action summary As a complement to LCP-Digitaal, consideration will be given to whether the current statutory crisis instruments (including emergency legislation) for dealing with national crises are sufficient for crises involving cyber elements. In this connection, we will consider introducing a ranking system.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p>
<p>Action summary Relevant regional crisis plans will be aligned with the LCP-Digitaal.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved Safety regions</p>

<p>Action summary The Netherlands will take an active role in the ongoing development of international crisis networks.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved DEF, BZ</p>
<p>Action summary Continue developing the National Response Network (NRN) into a national incident-response network, for instance by providing Defence cyber capabilities for military assistance and support. Enhance efforts through strategic secondment of cyber experts between central and subnational government organisations. Extend public-private partnerships. Identify existing response capability..</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2025</p>	<p>Owner J&V, DEF</p> <p>Involved NRN partners</p>
<p>Action summary Develop knowledge products/services to advise organisations on their incident-response processes (factsheets, white papers, runbooks, etc.).</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved NCSC, DTC</p>
<p>Action summary Intelligence-based incident coordination by AIVD and MIVD to be further expanded, partly through collaboration in the Cyber Intel/Info Cell (CIIC).</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZK, DEF</p> <p>Involved NCSC, CIIC</p>
<p>Action summary The Ministry of Defence is investing in personnel and technical capacity throughout the chain to enable information to be shared faster and more securely, and to improve the response time for vulnerabilities and incidents. For further details, see Annex 2 of the 2022 Defence White Paper.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner DEF</p>

Exercises

<p>Action summary After the publication of the Government-wide Risk Analysis and the Government-wide Security Strategy, an interministerial exercise schedule will be drawn up, which will include the planning of cyber and hybrid exercises.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved All ministries</p>
<p>Action summary The national cyber exercise ISIDOOR will be held again. In the run-up, participants are being encouraged to ensure that their organisations have their own plans and procedures in place and that their staff have received the necessary training.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved NCSC, police, AIVD, MIVD and private partners</p>
<p>Action summary In addition to ISIDOOR, various sectoral and local exercises will be organised. Examples include the symposium (with a crisis simulation) that the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport is arranging for around 200 participants from all tiers of the health-care sector; the annual government-wide cyber programme which includes exercises; and local exercises such as 'Hack the Hague'.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved Ministries, public authorities, operational partners and private partners</p>
<p>Action summary Yearly exercises will be held by public authorities (central government, provinces, municipalities and water authorities) using a simulated hacking attack. In addition, webinars will be held throughout the year, allowing organisations within and outside government to share knowledge.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved Subnational authorities</p>

<p>Action summary The Ministry of Defence will organise more frequent cyber exercises, and in doing so will seek to link up with national and international partners.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner DEF</p>
<p>Action summary The Netherlands takes part in international NATO and EU exercises, including PACE, CMX and Blue OLEx, and will strive towards more intensive annual participation.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V, DEF</p> <p>Involved AIVD, MIVD, NCSC</p>

The end of the public transport smart card is approaching. It will soon be possible to check in on public transport with a debit card or a smartphone. This should make travel and payment easier. A change like this is a huge operation. More than 60,000 ticket barriers and card readers will need to be converted.



Pillar II

Secure and innovative digital products and services

Aim 1: Digital products and services are more secure

European legislation for digital products and services

<p>Action summary</p> <p>In the negotiations on the EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), the government is pressing for the inclusion of a duty of care for manufacturers and suppliers of all ICT products, services and processes, including related standards and supervision. This duty of care should apply throughout the entire life cycle.</p>	<p>Timeline</p> <p>2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner</p> <p>EZK</p> <p>Involved</p> <p>J&V, BZK, private partners</p>
<p>Action summary</p> <p>The government will promote cohesion in legislation on products and services by, for example, working to ensure that the CRA ties in with sector-specific cybersecurity requirements in EU regulations (such as those that apply to medical devices and cars) and general legislation such as the General Product Safety Directive and the Product Liability Directive.</p>	<p>Timeline</p> <p>2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner</p> <p>EZK</p> <p>Involved</p> <p>J&V, VWS, I&W, private partners</p>
<p>Action summary</p> <p>Together with private parties, the government is contributing, via the Royal Netherlands Standardization Institute (NEN), to the creation of European harmonised standards for cybersecurity requirements in accordance with the Radio Equipment Directive.</p>	<p>Timeline</p> <p>2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner</p> <p>EZK</p> <p>Involved</p> <p>NEN, private partners</p>

Supervision and enforcement in respect of digital products and service

<p>Action summary Consumers and businesses will be informed about the Sales of Goods Directive and the Digital Content Directive, on the basis of which consumers are entitled to (security) updates for as long as they may reasonably expect them.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved ACM</p>
<p>Action summary The Radiocommunications Agency Netherlands (AT) is tightening its supervision of cybersecurity market entry requirements for wireless networking devices under the Radio Equipment Directive, for example through research via the Internet of Things test lab and boosting capacity.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved AT</p>
<p>Action summary As the Netherlands' national cybersecurity certifying authority, the AT supervises certification schemes in the Netherlands and authorises the issue of certificates with a 'high' certification level. It also works with the AIVD's National Communications Security Agency.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved AT, AIVD</p>
<p>Action summary The Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) monitors the product suppliers who are required to inform consumers as to how long security and other updates will be available.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved ACM</p>

<p>Action summary The Radiocommunications Agency and the Authority for Consumers and Markets will collaborate more closely to improve monitoring and enforcement in relation to secure products and services, for instance by drawing up a joint exercise schedule.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved AT, ACM</p>
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Certification and standards

<p>Action summary In partnership with private stakeholders, the government will contribute to the development and adoption of European cybersecurity certification schemes for ICT products, services and processes, such as those for cloud services, 5G technology and Common Criteria.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved BZK, J&V, private stakeholders</p>
<p>Action summary The government is committed to the development of European certification schemes for secure software and cybersecurity services.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved J&V, BZK, private stakeholders</p>
<p>Action summary The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy(EZK) is raising awareness and stimulating the implementation of certification schemes under the EU Cybersecurity Act.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved AT</p>

<p>Action summary The Baseline Security Product Assessment will be developed further, so that it corresponds to similar European evaluation standards to promote the exchangeability of secure European products. The AIVD is also working with the Radiocommunications Agency on the transition from the national scheme NSCIB, based on Common Criteria, to the European scheme, as soon as the Cybersecurity Act comes into force.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved AIVD, EZK</p>
<p>Action summary The government is stimulating contacts with like-minded third countries about aligning international standards with European ones, as well as the development of similar legislation and standards in those countries.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved J&V, BZ, private stakeholders</p>
<p>Action summary The government will explore how organisations can be better enabled to make clear agreements with their clients about cybersecurity. To this end, it will examine contract law practices and best practices in business-to-business relationships between suppliers of ICT products and services and clients.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved DTC, private stakeholders</p>

General Security Requirements for Central Government (ABRO) and government procurement policy

<p>Action summary General Security Requirements for Central Government (ABRO) will be drawn up on the basis of the development of the existing General Security Requirements relating to Defence Orders (ABDO), which must be met by companies fulfilling sensitive and/or classified government contracts.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved DEF, J&V AIVD, MIVD</p>
<p>Action summary The cybersecurity procurement requirements (ICO) tool will be developed further, expanded and implemented. This will include the further development of government-wide sets of requirements. This will have a positive indirect effect on the market since it will encourage the supply of secure products and services.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved CIP, EZK, subnational authorities</p>
<p>Action summary Together with the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG), the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will examine what is necessary to raise supplier management for subnational authorities to a higher level, with a focus on integrating service provision into procurement support and organising effective supervision of suppliers.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved CIP, EZK, subnational authorities</p>

<p>Action summary The Centre for Information Security and Privacy is developing a package of cybersecurity requirements and a tool that will support public sector organisations in the procurement of ICT products and services. This tool will be developed further and the public sector will be encouraged to use it. In addition, legislation will ensure that use of the sets of norms for secure purchasing is made mandatory for the public sector.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK, BZK</p> <p>Involved Subnational authorities</p>
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<p>Action summary The government is compiling long-term thematic roadmaps on the basis of which research will be conducted or outsourced by the dcypher platform. These include roadmaps on cryptocommunications and automated vulnerability scanning.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved J&V, BZK, DEF, OCW, I&W, private stakeholders, knowledge institutions</p>
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Aim 2: The Netherlands has a robust cybersecurity knowledge-and-innovation chain

Secure cryptography

<p>Action summary The development of high-assurance products will be stimulated by enhanced and coordinated commissioning from central government, so that the Netherlands always has reliable cryptographic solutions at its disposal. This will be done in close collaboration with the Dutch cryptographic industry.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved AIVD, J&V, DEF, EZK, OCW, I&W, private stakeholders, knowledge institutions</p>
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<p>Action summary Together with the business sector and research institutions, studies will be conducted on the development of modern, high-quality security products.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p> <p>Involved AIVD, J&V, DEF, EZK, OCW, I&W, private stakeholders, knowledge institutions</p>
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Nationwide knowledge and innovation research collaboration

<p>Action summary Interministerial cybersecurity knowledge and innovation requirements will be identified and listed on an annual basis. Needs will be prioritised where necessary.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved BZK, J&V, OCW, DEF, I&W</p>
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<p>Action summary The Ministry of Defence is reinforcing the Cyber Innovation Hub (CIH) in order to expand the innovation portfolio and strengthen the Netherlands' position in cybersecurity knowledge and innovation networks.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner DEF</p>
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<p>Action summary In accordance with a multiannual agenda and in partnership with a number of knowledge and other institutions, NCSC is conducting research activities in various domains on the role of NCSC and its target group(s).</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved NCSC</p>
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<p>Action summary The cybersecurity knowledge and innovation requirements of the business sector and knowledge institutions will become part of the Dutch Top Sectors Programme.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved Private stakeholders</p>
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European research collaboration and funding

<p>Action summary A National Coordination Centre (NCC-NL) will be set up at the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO) as part of the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre and Network (ECCCN).</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved BZK, DEF, J&V, OCW, I&W</p>
<p>Action summary Organisations in the dcypher network will be supported via the National Coordination Centre in preparing and implementing projects stemming from European initiatives and funds, such as Digital Europe and Horizon 2020.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p>
<p>Action summary Active measures will be taken to incorporate the research requirements of Dutch organisations in new work programmes by, for instance, Digital Europe and Horizon 2020, making use of Dutch cybersecurity expertise and innovative capacity.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved OCW, J&V, BZK, DEF, I&W</p>



Pillar III

Countering threats posed by states and criminals

Airports are no longer trying to stand out from the crowd with just the services and facilities they offer. Digitalisation and data are also areas in which they are advancing rapidly. For both passengers and cargo, this also means greater dependence on technology and greater potential vulnerability.



Aim 1: The Netherlands has a clear understanding of cyber threats posed by states and criminals

Understanding of threats posed by state actors

<p>Action summary Research capacity will be expanded to allow in-depth intelligence-based investigation, which will provide a broader understanding of current and potential cyber threats.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZK, DEF</p> <p>Involved AIVD, MIVD</p>
<p>Action summary Unique intelligence will be translated into specific courses of action that will enable clients to protect themselves more effectively.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZK, DEF</p> <p>Involved AIVD, MIVD</p>
<p>Action summary The scope for effective deployment of special investigative powers in respect of countries with an offensive cyber programme will be increased. A bill to this effect will be submitted to the House of Representatives.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZK, DEF</p> <p>Involved AIVD, MIVD</p>

Cybercriminal research and investigative capacity

<p>Action summary Together with local authorities and private partners, the police and the Public Prosecution Service (OM) will work to develop non-criminal-law interventions as well as criminal-law interventions to fight cybercrime, including ransomware attacks.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved Police, OM, BZK, subnational authorities, BZ</p>
<p>Action summary Efforts will be made to enhance cybersecurity knowledge and expertise within the Public Prosecution Service.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved OM</p>
<p>Action summary The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMAR) and the police will explore scope for further collaboration in tackling (cross-border) cybercrime.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V, DEF</p> <p>Involved KMAR</p>
<p>Action summary The Public Prosecution Service will investigate the possibility of expediting cybercrime cases by means of a fast-track procedure.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved OM</p>
<p>Action summary The police will compile an annual security assessment on cybercrime and digitalised criminality. This will help build a picture of the main criminal phenomena, operating methods and risk levels facing society. These assessments will guide the police and the Public Prosecution Service in deciding where to focus and which investigations should be prioritised.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved Police, OM</p>

Strengthening the diplomatic network

<p>Action summary The number of cyber diplomats and their tasks will be increased in order to enhance the level of information we possess about digital threats and developments. This will be done by means of proactive reporting based on diplomatic contacts in third countries.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZ</p> <p>Involved DEF, BZK, J&V</p>
<p>Action summary Increase cyber competence and knowledge within the mission network to ensure that cybersecurity is better integrated in regular diplomatic contacts and related policy areas.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZ</p> <p>Involved DEF, BZK, J&V</p>
<p>Action summary The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ) will press for better international information-sharing and joint analysis in the EU and NATO and, where necessary, will initiate smaller coalitions to improve the situational cyber-threat picture.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZ</p> <p>Involved DEF, BZK, J&V, NCSC</p>
<p>Action summary The NCSC will begin implementing the capacity-building programme internationally, including through the design of training activities.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved BZ, NCSC</p>
<p>Action summary The Ministry of Defence will participate in cyber initiatives, e.g. within the European Defence Fund and via PESCO projects, and will take a leading role within the EU and NATO. Participation in international exercises will become the norm.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner DEF</p> <p>Involved BZ</p>

Aim 2: The Netherlands has a handle on the cyber threats posed by states and criminals

Attribution and response

<p>Action summary Together with international partners, the government will develop new, more effective options for a diplomatic response to cyber threats. Existing frameworks and tools, such as the interministerial diplomatic cyber-incident response framework, the EU's Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox and the NATO Guide will be developed further and in alignment with the Government-wide State Threat Response Framework.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZ</p> <p>Involved DEF, BZK, J&V, AIVD, MIVD, NCSC</p>
<p>Action summary The Netherlands will take the initiative in building smaller international coalitions to address specific incidents or threats and to stimulate EU and NATO policymaking on (diplomatic) response and attribution.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZ</p> <p>Involved DEF, BZK, J&V, NCSC</p>

Defensive and offensive cyber capabilities

<p>Action summary The Ministry of Defence will invest in its overall cyber capabilities chain, partly by structurally embedding and enlarging cyber rapid response teams (CRRTs) and cyber mission teams (CMTs). It will also invest in increasing personnel readiness via training and exercises.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner DEF</p> <p>Involved BZ</p>
<p>Action summary The Ministry of Defence will expand support structures to provide assistance to other organisations in major incidents, for example via the National Response Network (NRN).</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner DEF</p> <p>Involved J&V</p>
<p>Action summary Explore the possibilities for and implementation of active cyber defence measures in the context of the implementation of NIS2 and the (temporary) blocking of malicious traffic by Dutch internet service providers, with the necessary judicial safeguards in the context of national risk mitigation, preventing additional victims and reducing the threat.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved EZK, BZK, DEF, NCSC, AIVD, MIVD, BZ</p>

Aim 3: States adhere to the normative framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace

Normative framework

<p>Action summary The UN's normative framework for cyberspace will be reinforced and consolidated in multilateral negotiations through effective focus on Dutch priorities, which include protecting the internet's core functionality and the multistakeholder model for internet governance.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZ</p> <p>Involved DEF, EZK, J&V, BZK</p>
<p>Action summary Observance and implementation of the UN's normative framework will be fostered by contributing to the establishment of the Programme of Action as an implementation mechanism. The government will be transparent about the implementation of the normative framework in the Netherlands.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZ</p> <p>Involved DEF, J&V, EZK, BZK</p>

Internet governance

<p>Action summary Participation by the Dutch multistakeholder community in the international debate will be encouraged (as will a similar commitment from the EU in respect of the European multistakeholder community) in order to amplify calls for an open, free and secure internet.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved BZ</p>
<p>Action summary The Netherlands will actively participate in international discussions about technical internet standards and other norms that affect the openness, freedom and security of the internet. This will include coordinating points of view at EU level and with like-minded countries.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved BZ</p>
<p>Action summary Multistakeholder organisations should be more effective in recognising and addressing social and technological challenges with regard to internet governance. This will enable consensus/decisions on solutions to those challenges to be reached more quickly. The government aims to stimulate this by taking an active part in discussions, encouraging like-minded countries to step up their presence, and by putting the outcome of the ICANN discussions on the agenda in both the Internet Governance Forum and the EU.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved BZ</p>



Increasing digitalisation opens up countless opportunities for education, for example by offering online lectures and unlocking knowledge. At the same time, this greater reliance on technology carries its own risks. A number of universities have been targeted by ransomware attacks in recent years.



Pillar IV

Cybersecurity labour market, education and cyber resilience of the public

Aim 1: The public are properly protected against cyber risks

Public information campaigns

<p>Action summary The Ministries of Justice and Security (J&V), Economic Affairs and Climate Policy (EZK), and the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) will organise target-group-specific cybersecurity information campaigns focusing on basic cybersecurity measures. The effects will be measured after each campaign. The campaigns will be organised in collaboration with municipalities to ensure optimum use of the available municipal communication channels.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner J&V, EZK, BZK</p> <p>Involved Subnational authorities</p>
<p>Action summary As part of City Deal Cybercrime³, pilot projects will be rolled out with a view to increasing public and corporate resilience against cybercrime. The pilots will focus on greater integrality to ensure better and wider use of local best practices, with a view to developing nationwide support services.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK, J&V</p> <p>Involved Subnational authorities</p>
<p>Action summary The annual Alert Online cybersecurity awareness month will be held every October together with the partner network.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022</p>	<p>Owner EZK, J&V</p> <p>Involved BZK</p>

³ Collaboration between J&V and municipalities on cybercrime resilience

Security advice for the public

<p>Action summary Digital Government Information Units will be equipped to answer people's questions about cybersecurity and refer them where necessary to existing support centres, information helpdesks and local support initiatives by private partners.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p>
<p>Action summary The public-private website <i>veiliginternetten.nl</i> will be developed further and expanded as a one-stop shop for cybersecurity information and advice for the public on what action to take.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved BZK</p>
<p>Action summary The 'cyber weather forecast' will be published periodically and its effectiveness will be evaluated after two years.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved EZK</p>

Reliability of digital public services

<p>Action summary The government will set up a uniform domain name extension so that members of the public can see at a glance whether or not they are actually dealing with a government agency. This will help to combat online fraud, such as phishing.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p>
<p>Action summary To improve the government's online recognisability, a 'registry of public sector internet domains' is being developed, so that the public can easily check whether or not a domain name belongs to the government. In case of doubt as to the authenticity of a website, people will be able to consult a contact point.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2023</p>	<p>Owner BZK</p>

Aim 2: Members of the public respond to cyber incidents swiftly and efficiently

<p>Action summary The police will make it possible to report more cybercrime phenomena online from 2023.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner J&V</p> <p>Involved Police</p>
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Aim 3: School pupils are taught digital skills, with an emphasis on security

Curriculum

<p>Action summary The Netherlands Institute for Curriculum Development (SLO) has been tasked with working with the teaching profession to develop specific core objectives for basic skills, including cybersecurity skills, for both primary and secondary education. These detailed core objectives will be submitted to the House of Representatives in a bill in 2025.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2025</p>	<p>Owner OCW</p>
<p>Action summary A 'basic skills master plan' will be produced to ensure that teachers are properly equipped to provide the best education in language, arithmetic/mathematics, citizenship and computer literacy. The first schools will start on this when the 2022-2023 academic year begins.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner OCW</p>

Aim 4: The Dutch labour market can meet the growing demand for cybersecurity experts

Cybersecurity labour market

<p>Action summary Educational institutions will develop upskilling and reskilling programmes to enhance employees' cybersecurity expertise. To this end, they will working alongside the business community and other relevant parties. Any obstacles or limitations in that collaboration that stem from legislation will be identified and examined to see how they can be resolved.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner OCW</p> <p>Involved OCW, educational institutions and employers</p>
<p>Action summary The government will invest in higher professional education in the sciences, including cybersecurity. Resources will be allocated to (1) higher intake, (2) lower drop-out and switch rates, (3) higher lateral intake, and (4) induction in/hot transfer to the labour market. This measure is intended to mitigate the shortfalls in the labour market.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2029</p>	<p>Owner OCW</p> <p>Involved HBOs</p>

<p>Action summary Subject to the definitive advice of an independent committee (which is expected in late September/early October 2022), cybersecurity investments will be made for a number of specific areas of university education, working from the sector plans. The aim of this funding is to stimulate collaboration. For each sector/domain, universities will perform an analysis identifying opportunities and problems, and proposing measures to respond to them. The sector plan submitted for 'Technology' will include a focus on cybersecurity. University cybersecurity courses will benefit too in this manner.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner OCW</p> <p>Involved Universities</p>
<p>Action summary The qualitative and quantitative shortages on the cybersecurity labour market will be examined, and recommendations will be made on how to address them.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved OCW, J&V, employers, CBS, University Committee for Academic Practice</p>
<p>Action summary The government will explore whether the initiatives designed to shed light on ICT-wide shortages and the development of an ICT dashboard for education and the labour market also provide sufficient insight into regional shortages of cybersecurity specialists.</p>	<p>Timeline 2023 - 2024</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved OCW, SZW, BZK</p>

<p>Action summary Via the 'Human Capital Agenda ICT', the government aims to increase the supply of cybersecurity and ICT specialists to the labour market, and enhance the quality of that supply. This will be done in close collaboration with the business sector, regional and local government organisations and educational institutions.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p>
<p>Action summary Via thematic roadmaps and communities, the government will foster discussions between knowledge institutions and the business community regarding the high-end knowledge development needed to generate innovative product development.</p>	<p>Timeline 2022 - 2026</p>	<p>Owner EZK</p> <p>Involved dcypher</p>

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